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Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel fasst die Beziehung  zwischen kollektivem Gedächtnis, individuellem Gerech-
tigkeitsempfinden und der Fähigkeit zur Vergebung in der Gesellschaft Bosnien- 
Herzegowinas (bh) zusammen und zeigt auf, dass Gerechtigkeit unter den aktuellen 
sozialen Gegebenheiten unmöglich ist. In der Gesellschaft von bh wird Gerechtigkeit 
praktisch durch die staatliche Verfassung behindert, mit der eine Kultur der Erinnerung 
erschwert wird,  welche ein wichtiger Schritt auf dem Weg zur Gerechtigkeit wäre. Zudem 
wird erläutert, warum die Überzeugung der Täter als ungerecht und falsch interpretiert 
werden kann. Im ersten Teil des Artikels wird dargestellt, wie die Instrumentalisierung 
der Vergangenheit den Bürgerkrieg (1992 – 1995) beeinflusst hat. Darauf aufbauend kann 
aufgezeigt werden, dass die  gleiche Manipulation der Geschichte im heutigen Schulsys-
tem und damit in einer der wichtigsten Institutionen für Weitergabe eines historischen 
Gedächtnisses präsent ist. Im Anschluss daran wird herausgearbeitet, dass die Sozial-
lehre der Kirche ein wertvoller Mechanismus für die Etablie rung einer gerechten Gesell-
schaft sein könnte, dass es ihr aber in diesem Kontext an Kraft fehlt,  dieses Potential 
freizusetzen. Zum Abschluss werden Möglichkeit der Vergebung diskutiert. Nach einer 
generellen Einführung in das Thema zeigt der Artikel sowohl die Schwierig keiten auf, 
die bereits beim terminologischen Konzept von Vergebung, als auch bei der praktischen 
Anwendung in der Gesellschaft  auftreten.
Abstract
This article is highlighting the correlation of collective memory, individual sense of justice 
and ability of forgiveness in the Bosnian- Herzegovinian (bh) society. With this paper I 
want to show that justice in bh society has been disabled by the constitutional arrange-
ment of the state itself, because it prevents a culture of memory, which is a necessary 
mechanism of transitional justice. I will also explain why the conviction of the perpetra-
tors may be interpreted as unjust and wrong. To develop my argument, in the first two 
parts of this article, I will start with how the instrumentalization of the past influenced 
the recent war in bh society (1992 – 1995). Then I will prove that the same manipulation 
of the past is present in today’s school system as well, especially having in mind that 
schools are one of the most important institutions for the transmission of historical 
memory. The next two parts of the article will show why the Church’s social teaching, 
a valuable mechanism for establishing a just society, is lacking force in this context. 
The last two parts of this paper discuss the possibility of forgiveness. After a general 
insight into this topic, the article shows the difficulties that are encountered already 
in the very concept of forgiveness, as well as in its practical application in bh society.
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Introductory remarks
The history of the Balkans is also a history of ethnic conflicts.  Ethnic 
conflicts represent a major challenge for academic circles, not only 
because of the cruelty of their development, but also because of their 
potential repetition due to their presentation as a correction of the past. 
One of the major causes of today’s ethnic conflicts is the selective and 
one- sided memory of injustices committed in the past, and one of the 
goals of these conflicts is the correction of history. Due to certain psycho- 
social factors, violence is presented as a kind of a legitimate defense (a 
moral issue), as well as the justified protection of historical and per-
manently threatening enemies (a rights issue). Thus, when one idea is 
blessed by moral justification and justified by civic duty, even if there 
is clear experimentally verifiable data that speaks against the validity of 
this idea, individuals will more easily suspect what they see rather than 
critically question the ideology they believe in. 1 Even twenty- two years 
after the war, the context of the bh society is still dominated by this con-
flict  ideology. The war has created deep ethnic divisions, strengthened 
old prejudices and created new ones, causing deep divisions and dis-
trust among citizens. The long history of internal and external political 
manipulation has led the State to the edge of primary material poverty, 
as well as profound spiritual- moral poverty. As Tarik Haverić observes: 
“Twenty years after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina still remains an 
undefined political space with many variables and only one constant – 
the material and cultural decline of the overall population” (2016, 11). 
This is to say, the state is still struggling to achieve the minimum of 
political and economic stability, and, according to some authors, the 
potential for social unrest and ethnic violence is more but real. Kivimäki 
et al (2012, 12 – 13) list three potential motives for possible new conflicts: 
1 See for more information Maros 2014 and 2015. Since the subject of the article 
(because of all historical and social circumstances) is demanding, complex 
and ideologically burdened, I emphasize here that some parts were presented 
with a reductionist approach. The scope and the structure of this article do 
not allow me to go into more detail, especially regarding the historical events. 
This complexity is also a reason for my choice of literature. I also point out 
that the parts in which I outlined personal attitudes (especially in the last part 
as well as in the conclusion) are, although being personal reflections, written 
from the position of Christian social ethics, as I have underlined at the end of 
the article.
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first, the shadows of the past, or complaints about historical injustices 
or victimization by each of the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats)2; second, dissatisfaction caused by unemployment, 
corruption and crime; and finally, a criminal economy motivated by 
profit and non- enforcement of the law.
Starting from this situation, this paper stresses how this current socio- 
political mentality is conditioned by a certain violent “socio- psychological 
infrastructure”3 (Bar- Tal 2007, 1431) from which I will highlight the abuse 
of memory as one of the more influential factors. As we will see, this 
abuse of memory was not just one of the major reasons for the destruc-
tion during the war of the nineteen nineties, but it is also a dominant 
feature of today’s bh society.
1 Memory and its abuses
According to Daniel Bar-Tal, there are a number of social beliefs that 
trigger the creation of certain mindsets that facilitate participation in 
violence. According to the author, in situations of intractable conflict, 
people activate and develop certain psychological capacities or mecha-
nisms to help them cope with the new situation. Some of these psycho-
logical beliefs are: a belief in the correctness of one’s own convictions, a 
belief in the threats to one’s own safety and survival resulting from vic-
timization, and a strong sense of belonging to a particular group, which 
corresponds to a strong sense of patriotism, or more exactly, extreme 
nationalism (see 2007, 1432 – 1436). While this socio- psychological infra-
structure helps people cope with the new situation during the conflict, 
2 The term constituent people is an expression that by the Dayton Peace Agreement 
refers to majority population in bh. The war in the nineties was formally ended 
by this agreement, which was “a political compromise with the aim of stopping 
the war” (Bakšić- Muftić 2005, 67). By this political compromise, bh is defined 
as a democratic state with three constituent peoples: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, 
alongside with others (see Bakšić- Muftić 2005, 71).
3 According to Bar- Tal a socio- psychological infrastructure is a necessary psycho-
logical condition that evolves during an intractable conflict and “plays a deter-
minative role in its development, continuation, and later in its resolution and 
reconciliation” (2007, 1431). This infrastructure “consists of three elements: col-
lective memories, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation, which 
are in mutual interrelations” (Bar- Tal 2007, 1435).
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after the conflict it becomes a prism through which the society creates 
its own environment, interprets the experience, makes decisions and 
takes certain kinds of action (see 2007, 1446). In order to facilitate the 
mobilization of people, demagogues use these categories to manipulate 
people, and to urge them to violence. Furthermore, this structure will 
be introduced in educational material and thus becomes the primary 
means of future socialization. It becomes a part of public opinion, actively 
sustained and promoted by a number of social institutions (see 2007, 
1435 – 1438). Therefore, these beliefs are determining the future of the 
society and thus, when this mindset is adopted, the socio- psychological 
infrastructure “endures even in the face of contradictory information” 
(2007, 1445).
According to Bar-Tal therefore, social beliefs are, more or less, caused 
by collective memory. Collective memory is not a presentation of docu-
mented history that is “structured on the basis of critical research methods” 
(Dogliotti/Rosiello 1997, 1054) but it is the memory of filtered historical 
events that makes a version of history functional for the requirements of 
the present (see Fabietti 1998, 68 – 72). Although it is a fabricated truth, 
or narrative version of the past, this version of the history does not lose 
its social value. Defined as a collection of memories from a shared past, 
this memory offers the groups the cognitive map that helps them reas-
sure themselves about who they are. This memory becomes a point of 
reference which serves not only as the basis for the creation of identity, 
but also for its legitimacy (see Eyerman 2007, 63 – 64).
Therefore, collective memory plays a significant role in the creation 
of individual and collective consciousness, and being burdened with 
emotion, values and symbols, it is subjected to various misuses. One of 
these is victimization, or the reference to events in one’s past as a cover 
and justification for aggression toward others. In order to achieve an 
aggressive strategy against neighboring nations, it is necessary to evoke 
a common identity, confirmed by an unquestionable past, as well as 
induce whatever it takes to preserve the future of one’s own group (see 
Fabietti/Matera 2006, 115, 180).
The return of historical memory confirms inalienable rights and sacred 
values and mobilizes people by representing the nation as a victim of the 
past. Due to its selective approach, collective memory is often a vindictive 
and suffering memory, which creates strong inter- ethnic, inter- religious 
and international tensions. The past becomes a policy of memory focused 
on achieving clearly defined goals, such as strengthening ethnic identity 
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or drawing clear lines of demarcation between us and them (in and out 
group) (see Buttino/Rutto 1997, 11 – 12). A group tending to observe its 
history in terms of victimization and injustice is likely to engage in vio-
lent actions in the future. Storytelling to the young generations keeps 
this memory alive. It becomes the reference point for the present, as well 
as the reference point for future victimization (see Volkan 2001, 87– 88).
Further, the consequences of personal and individual traumas can be 
transferred to future generations and include millions of people, thus 
making them an inseparable part of the community’s identity. This is 
a phenomenon that Vamik D. Volkan calls “chosen trauma” (Volkan 
2001, 87 – 88). Future generations subconsciously individualize common 
images of historical tragedy, which can develop into some kind of duty 
to preserve the memory of ancestors, mourn their losses or correct their 
humiliation by avenging them. According to Volkan, preserving a men-
tal representation of trauma of one’s nation, becomes the central task 
for future generations and, depending on external circumstances, may 
be differently expressed depending on the generation concerned. One 
generation may simply mourn the tragedy of their people, while another 
generation may see it as their duty to correct the past, and to avenge their 
ancestors (see Volkan 2000, 15). Since victimization is a part of group 
identity, it serves as a prism through which the members of the group 
interpret the conflict. In addition, victimization increases the feeling of 
solidarity, a social glue that binds members and motivates the creation 
of a strong nationalism. Prejudices and stereotypes, both significantly 
influenced by victimization, contribute to the creation of this strong sense 
of nationalism. The individuals act on the basis of preconceived notions, 
and on the information and feelings they have about the conflict. This 
psychologically enabled conflict determines the level of hostility, hatred 
and distrust between groups (see Bar- Tal u. a. 2009, 242 – 247).
2 Concretization of misuse of memory  
in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The current misuse of historical narratives and the reshaping of collective 
memory has its beginnings in the late ninteen eighties. What the people 
will remember and what they will incorporate into their narrative to a 
large degree depends on the social processes. Such public and official 
celebrations of certain historical events, commemorations or other types 
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of cultural expressions (books, movies, music), especially depend on the 
educational system (see Rydgren 2007, 232).  Regarding the breakup 
of Yugoslavia, many different authors agree about the impact of the 
 collective memory on the outbreak of war. In fact, during communism, 
factual analysis and confrontation with history was sacrificed at the altar 
of the concept of brotherhood and unity of all people. The memories of 
different ethnic groups were systematically suppressed and selectively 
banned. Thus, in the name of the ideology of peaceful multiethnic 
coexistence, Tito’s regime removed the memory of the internal ethnic 
violence during the Second World War (WWII) from official national 
history. However, disparities of collective memory between different 
groups continued to exist (see Diegoli 2007, 17). This erasure of history, 
this avoidance of addressing the facts, and this failure to  recognize these 
crimes – this “silence of Yugoslavia” (Weine 1999, 28) – has created gaps 
in the official history. In the nineties those gaps were filled with ethnic 
nationalism, according to the ideological needs of a given situation (see 
Jukić 1997, 291). The denial of historical events created an environment 
that allowed the emergence of nationalistic objections to the account 
of history, which were then used as justification for the war in the nine-
ties (see Diegoli 2007, 17). Invoking the horrors of World War II, those 
massacres were posthumously justified. After the collapse of communism, 
memory, having been suppressed for a long time, had returned with 
all its strength and was re- oriented to political goals (see Diegoli 2007, 
46 – 47; see Jukić 1997, 292)4.
This suppressed memory refers to the complex history of the peo-
ples who have lived on the former Yugoslavia territory. Though it may 
be  scientifically reductive, for the purposes of this article, I highlight 
the events which, according to the authors, were most decisive for the 
4 The silence of Yugoslavia concerns also to the exact number of the victims on the 
territory of the prewar Yugoslavia for the period between 1941 and 1945. According 
to Zerjevic, the initial account of 1.7 million casualties of war was established 
and was officially given by the government to support the Yugoslavian request 
for reparation at the Paris Conference. According to the author, the responsi-
bility of the official governmental organizations for the consequences of hiding 
the exact number of the victims, has now been uncovered: “In fact, covering the 
truth about the victims of war caused enormous tensions between the various 
nationalities, and, unfortunately, was utilized by Serbia to commence the war 
against Croatia under the pretext of its ‘moral’ foundation to do so” (Zerjavic 
1998, 2).
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awakening of fear and nationalism in the nineties. As an example of 
correcting the past, the authors cite the ancient Kosovo battle of 1389. 
According to their interpretation, Slobodan Milošević, then president of 
Serbia, mobilized the Serb people for warfare by gloryfing the Kosovo 
battle memory, by which outcome the rule of the Ottoman Empire 5 
over the Serbian people had begun. Since the Bosnian Muslims were 
seen as a continuation of the Ottoman Turks, violence against them in 
the nineties was understood as a form of just correction of the historical 
tragedy (see more in: Volkan 2001, 89 – 93).
Additionally, for the mobilization by glory based on the myth of the 
Kosovo battle, the official narrative was used to unify the masses also 
by fear. The experience of Jasenovac 6, as well as the systematic persecu-
tion of Serbs during the Second World War, was seen as a confirmation 
of the continued Croatian conspiracy against the Serb people. On the 
Bosniaks’ side, the memory of pogroms and atrocities that the Muslim 
population experienced after WW I and during WW II justified the 
conviction that the Bosniaks were only defending themselves against the 
5 With the Kosovo battle, the period of the Turkish (Ottoman) rule that put  Balkan 
peoples into Turkish slavery began. This battle was seen as the beginning of all 
troubles and for the Serbs it was “a decisive conflict between Christianity and 
Islam, in which the Serb people sacrificed itself for the good of all Europe as a 
Christ for the good of a mankind” (Pirjevec 2002, 5). The Ottoman Empire 
was a powerful and intimidating military machine that inflicted a great deal 
of violence on all subordinate peoples on the greater part of the Balkan Penin-
sula. From that violence of perpetual threats and forcible Islamization Croatia 
liberated itself in 1683, bh in 1878 by being annexed to the Austro- Hungarian 
Empire, and after many attempts and uprisings, the Serbs freed themselves from 
the Turkish authorities during the Balkan wars in 1912 – 1913 (see Pirjevec 2002, 
5 – 6). According to Volkan, “the mental representation of the Battle of Kosovo 
played a major role in the atrocities in Bosnia- Herzegovina”, it was their chosen 
trauma (Volkan 2001, 89).
6 Although it is not politically correct to put Jasenovac and Bleiburg in the same 
category, I do it here for practical reasons. Jasenovac (concentration camp for 
Serbs) and Bleiburg (suffering of the Croatian Army and civilians) are the sym-
bols of suffering of the Serbian and Croat peoples during World War II, which 
both peoples took as evidence for the genocide of an entire nation. The number 
of victims presented by some of the authors range from five hundred thousand 
to one million Serbs killed in Jasenovac (see Zerjavic 1998, 9), and  approximately 
three hundred thousand Croats killed at Bleiburg, “including the victims of the 
so- called Way of the Cross / Death Marches” (Zerjavic 1998, 3). For this argu-
ment see more in the quoted article which is a short version of the author’s book 
on this topic: Zerjavic 1998.
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Serb domination during the Yugoslav period. Moreover, since in Com-
munist Yugoslavia the Bosniaks (at that time acknowledged as Muslims 7) 
were long perceived as Islamized Serbs and Croats, Bosniaks believed 
that they were a constant target of Croatian and Serb ethnic nationalists. 
Simultaneously, the Croatian nationalists’ narrative used the oppression 
by Tito’s regime and the crime committed in Bleiburg as a confirma-
tion of Serb cruelty and a testimony to their centuries- long aspiration 
for the creation of Great Serbia; all of which led them to regard their 
crimes in the nineties as a defense against Serbian nationalism and as a 
defense of Croatia’s homeland against Serbian aggression (see Kivimäki 
et al 2012, 34 – 43).
During Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the former Yugoslav republics broke 
up into states, according to national characteristics. It was clear then 
that bh, with its multinational make- up, would be the greatest vic-
tim of the collapse of Yugoslavia. For the survival of sovereign bh as 
a multinational society, strong leadership and common interests were 
needed. However, the national parties that won the first elections, started 
from the very beginning with nationalist ideologies that to a certain 
extent legitimized nationalism on all three sides (Bosniaks, Serbian and 
 Croatian). Bosniak extremists expected that bh would be delegated only 
to Bosniaks, while the other two nationalisms (Serbian and Croatian) 
were conducting preparations for the creation of autonomous areas that 
would afterwards merge with either Croatia or Serbia, while the rest of 
the country could then be given to Muslims of bh (see Cvitković 2006, 
16). Therefore, each of the three constituent peoples considered itself 
to be endangered, because each of them entered the nineties with both 
fictional and also real historical injustices, and the situation at the time 
provided grounds for fear of the possible repetition of these injustices. 
Each of these peoples was also afraid that bh would be delegated to one 
of these peoples, and that the other nation would be oppressed and 
7 At the time of Yugoslavia, there was a kind of alliance union of Croatian and 
Serbian nationalists directed against Muslims and their ‘fundamentalist ideo-
logy’. Behind this alliance was an actual quarrel on the issue of whether the Bos-
nian State is Croatian or Serbian. A consequence of this Croatian and Serbian 
nationalism in the post- Yugoslavian era was a distinction between ‘historical’ 
and ‘non- historical’ peoples, denying the right to Muslim national identity (see 
Cvitković 2006, 11) established by the Dayton Agreement, which had confirmed 
the constitution of a nation under the name of Bosniaks.
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deprived of their rights. The fear of extermination, which motivated the 
war crimes, was at the same time a fear of assimilation by the majority 
group, so each of these three nationalisms aspired for an  ethnically pure 
territory which they have succeeded to gain, partly through the war in 
the nineties and partly by the Dayton Peace Agreement (see Cvitković 
2006, 16 – 18).
In bh, we today witness the same mechanism of selecting historical 
events and creating a mythological past through different, unrecon-
ciled narratives – I dare to claim, in even more  devastating dimensions. 
The same silence of Yugoslavia that destroyed the country in the 1990s is 
again present, albeit in a different context and with different methods 
and means, but by the same mentality and to an even worse effect. This 
memory, employed by nationalists to maintain their power, is made 
possible specifically through the educational system, which is “used 
for ‘self- reproduction,’ as well as for the production of desirable social 
opinions and behaviors, or to keep existing social and political relations” 
(Kapo 2012, 24).
The education system in bh is not governed at state level 8. Since the 
implementation of certain laws is in the hands of local authorities (in 
other words to 13 ministries of education!), today’s legal system allows 
three parallel and ethnically distinct and independent educational  systems: 
the Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian. Students are taught in a certain man-
ner depending on their ethnic origin, that is, depending on the region 
in which they happen to reside. This means that in each area, the ethnic 
majority determines the content and the method of teaching. This fos-
ters the creation of three separate and parallel official national histories, 
which makes development of a common national identity impossible 
(see Tribić 2007, 146, 182). In so- called mixed cantons, where war failed 
to create a distinct ethnic majority, the phenomenon of two schools under 
one roof has emerged. In these schools, students of  different ethnicities 
are divided into separate classrooms or use the school interchangea-
bly. Depending on the kind of building, the entrance and the facilities 
are sometimes also physically marked and separated.9 This system has 
8 This power has been given to two autonomous entities (to the Serb Republic 
and Federation of bh – to its ten cantons) and to the independent region of the 
Brčko District.
9 As, for example, a Catholic school center in Travnik where two entrances are 
split by a fence (see more in a short documentary: Šarenac 2017).
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created a homogeneous school environment where students do not 
meet those of other ethnicities (or religions), which raises the level of 
ignorance and consequently intolerance toward anyone labeled as other. 
This school system only deepens the differences and divisions, promoting 
ethnic segregation and separation because it indoctrinates students and 
exposes them to the political and ideological goals of the teachers and 
local authorities. In this situation, the teaching of history is particularly 
questionable, because various books used across the country present the 
events in a contradictory way, or at least in an unbalanced one, and the 
presentation of historical events or their analysis from multiple perspec-
tives is completely absent (see Diegoli 2007, 52 – 55. 85).10
If I add the fact that academic, politically unaffiliated or emotionally 
unencumbered research related to the past basically does not exist, this 
implicitly leads to the conclusion that throughout history, war has left 
nationalist politicians in power. The people who are writing the histo-
ries are the same people who now govern and who were involved in the 
structure of violence (at least, many of them). “What was not success-
fully carried out during the war continues to be carried out in a cold 
peace, through the ethno- nationalistic educational system. Certainly, 
the insurance of each ethnic group’s ‘own’ education system is intended 
to promote specific ideological and political goals” (Kapo 2012, 144). 
All three curriculums promote ready- made stereotypes, which usually 
present each history in a positive light or the ethnic group as a victim, 
and, in the absence of differing perspectives, the opportunity for critical 
 reflection is completely absent. In the same way, other ethnic groups, 
even when not explicitly presented as perpetrators, are usually charac-
terized by the negative connotation of others, reinforcing the view that 
we are different and better than them (see Tribić 2007, 179).
The study I am referring to analyzed the content of religious edu-
cation textbooks and the national group of subjects (mother tongue, 
geography, history). The analysis included 145 textbooks formally used 
throughout bh for the school year 2005/2006. These textbooks were 
approved by the relevant ministries of education. The analysis has pro-
duced devastating data. Despite all the positive content that corresponds 
10 This half- truth, which is prevalent in Bosnian society, is worst and even more 
dangerous than a pure lie. For those who refuse to choose one partial truth, 
the half- truth creates a kind of schizophrenic effect, a situation which makes 
it diffcult or impossible to act morally or to operate productively or creatively.
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to the criteria of education for an open, tolerant and equal society, the 
study showed that “the number of negative examples is up to 10 times 
higher than the number of positive examples” (Tribić 2007, 179). Most 
negative content refers to the stereotypical representation of one’s 
own (or another) faith, people, state, affiliation. In the reviewed text-
books, one part of the state, one religion, one culture and tradition 
are singled out. Specifically, history textbooks from the Croatian and 
Serbian curriculum emphasize belonging to the state of Croatia and 
Serbia instead of bh, while the textbooks for the Bosnian curriculum 
stereotypically emphasize the value of belonging to the Bosniak  people 
(Tribić 2007, 179; 182).
Thus, we have a society in which individual and collective identities are 
built on victimization and in which new generations are systematically 
brought up by being fed on the violent past; a society in which politics 
are sacralized and faith is politicized to the extent at which it becomes 
religious nationalism. This is a form of practical atheism because it is not 
only a question of omission in faith, but also a question of its negation (see 
more in: Šarčević, 2014, 7 – 10). We have a democratic society in which 
the nationalist political option and religious affiliation are the only civic 
options; a society in which personal identity, responsibility, and creativity, 
are replaced by affiliation, eligibility and obedience. What are rational 
and real possibilities for peaceful co- existence and rebuilding this society?
3 The lack of civil society and the possibility of justice
A brief summary of the most important aspects of the Church’s social 
doctrine, from its early days until the present teachings of Pope  Francis, 
would most probably emphasize how justice should be a method (and 
not the goal) for the true transformation of the world: “In the Chris-
tian ethical tradition there is an imperative to engage with the con-
crete political realities of the day, to challenge cultures of silence and to 
work toward a just and sustainable peace” (Hogan 2017, 244; see also 
 Valković 1991, 392). Considering that justice is an indispensable part 
of the  proclamation of the Gospel, the struggle for building a more 
rightful world is also, in the narrow sense, a form of public theology. In 
the wider sense, it is a form of public philosophy, the one that could 
enable communication between diverse national, ideological, cultural 
or religious groups. Therefore, Zdenko Spajić considers the Church’s 
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social teaching a valuable mechanism for establishing a just society in 
a multiethnic and multi- religious community such as bh. The author 
highlights that the interdisciplinary character of social teaching and its 
methodological framework (the possibility of knowing reality by the 
power of human reason) can be a useful mechanism for involving the 
Church in a public space, so that it can contribute to greater justice for 
both individuals and for the common good (see Spajić 2017, 215 – 216; 
see also Heyer 2017, 106). However, the author is aware that this doc-
trine has many difficulties in its practical application.
According to Spajić, there are two obstacles, both mental and phys-
ical, to building justice in bh society. The first is mental, and global 
as well, in today´s existing world- wide disproportion between beliefs 
and behavior. Namely, according Spajić the overwhelming majority – 
almost all Bosnia- Herzegovians call themselves believers – devout, and 
the majority of the leading politicians declared themselves practicing 
believers with active (more accurately, demonstrative)  participation in 
the religious rituals of their communities. The research the author refers 
to shows that 76.5 % of the political elite not only declare being believers 
but claim that faith has a major and important role in their life (Spajić 
2017, 236). These solemn statements, as well as public participation in 
religious ceremonies and religious greeting in state institutions and pub-
lic spaces, not just by the elite but also by ordinary citizens, are simply 
inconsistent with the current situation in society 11 and its social, cultural, 
mental and moral environments.
The second difficulty is of a physical nature, it is the deep fragmen-
tation of society. As the author claims, the existence of civil society is 
necessary for building social relations. Civil society is a polygon of any 
form and possibility of a just society. At the global level, due to glo-
balization and ever- greater interconnectedness and interdependence of 
people, new forms of association are constantly being sought in order to 
achieve common goals. For the last 25 years, in our country the process 
has been going in the reverse direction. It is a lasting and continuous 
11 Here I make a connection which may not be academic but it comes from a reli-
gious perspective: A society in “which religion has a significant role“ should be 
“healthier”. With “the situation” I mean what I already have said in the intro-
duction and the fact is that the country is still struggling to achieve a minimum 
of political and economic stability, because of corruption, crime and a crimi-
nal economy.
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disintegration, as we have already seen from the example of the school 
system. This fragmentation was greatly facilitated and strengthened by 
the last war. It is not only the division of society based on religious affil-
iation, ideological expression, or ethnicity, but also territorial division 
and, consequently, the division of powers. We should not forget that 
the territorial division of the State is a result of war activities, including 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. These crimes, as well as rapes, 
mass expulsion of civilians, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, have created 
internal borders within the state, thus creating the present structure and 
division of power, which is in fact a moral obstacle to the attainment of 
justice (see Spajić 2017, 234 – 235).
This problem of a moral nature mostly relates to the fact that the inter-
nal borders of this state, which were confirmed by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, had been created on the basis of crimes. The peace agree-
ment subsequently became the constitution of this state, determined the 
structure of its political authority and enabled a deeply unjust division 
of the country along ethnic and religious lines. Although some per-
petrators have been prosecuted at the ICTY (International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), the ideologies that led to them, as 
well as the policies that made these crimes possible, were not dismissed. 
This situation is directly opposed to what Marianne Heimbach- Steins 
sees as one of the ethical principles for dealing with the past, namely the 
need “that the powerful actors of the past (who were very likely actively 
involved in structures of injustice, persecution and violence) must be 
replaced by trusted new authorities“ (2017, 73). Heimbach-Steins admits 
the importance of the latter principle, especially in societies marked by 
deep ethnic and religious identification. Our society is exactly the one 
to which she refers. Even though the ICTY convicted individuals for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, still the main instrument for 
the commission of those crimes, which was the policy itself, has never 
been officially discredited.
4 The importance of the historical truth
I consider it essential to say that, despite the fact that the ICTY  judgments 
had a great and positive echo, it seems to me that these convictions only 
brought a form of moral satisfaction for certain victims (an outcome that 
should not be neglected!) but they could not bring reconciliation on 
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the level of society, because they were not able to convey the feeling that 
justice was done. The reason for this unjust judgment of the perpetrators is 
the lack of a culture of memory, which Heimbach- Steins defines as one 
of the ethical principles of dealing with the past necessary to building 
a just society: “Without a culture of memory it is unlikely that conflict, 
which may be hidden but ongoing, will be overcome“ (Heimbach- Steins 
2017, 73).
This lack of shared memory, as well as the entire atmosphere of 
 documented and almost institutionalized lies, are the cause for the 
problem that not a single judgment of the Court in The Hague has been 
perceived as correct or just by the whole society (that is, all citizens of 
bh). I dare to say that every convicted perpetrator caused additional 
division in society, because there was always at least one side, one or 
two ethnic groups, that perceived the judgment as a political means of 
historical manipulation and therefore an additional injustice and not 
as a legal act and the fair condemnation of factual crimes 12. As long as 
historical truth does not take priority, this state will live in the spasm of 
unresolved memories, and its citizens will be divided into victims and 
perpetrators. I do not absolutize this truth about history, but I point to 
it as a postulate, as a necessary mechanism of transitional justice that 
would be, together with other mechanisms, a necessary means for the 
establishment and restoration of this society. As long as the memory of 
12 As an example of the recent divided public opinion was the verdict against six 
former political and military leaders of Croats from bh accused of the joint 
criminal enterprise. One of them was Slobodan Praljak who drank poison in 
a Hague courtroom and killed himself on live television. Plenty of messages 
 posted on social media showed a deep public division in the Balkans. “For 
some, this was the final desperate act of a selfish villain; for others, that of 
a wrongly accused hero” (Milovanović 2017). The Croats are convinced that 
the verdict is only a political and not a legal one, and they claim and they 
claim that the  arguments which documented that united criminal enterprise 
are unproved, which Praljak has “proved and so defended the truth” (Pinter 
2017), on the other side, the Bosniak Internet portal was flooded by the mes-
sages of the approval of this verdict as a just and deserved one. Some of them 
compared general Praljak with the Nazis, saying that he is not the only villain 
who wanted to escape a justice by suicide. According to this portal, Praljak did 
the same as Himmler and Goebbels (see Depo 2017). One Croat journalist 
called the Bosniak reaction an “incredible amount of hatred and exultation”, 
“which only proves what Bosniaks really think about Croats” and means that 
for Bosniaks “coexistence with Croats is impossible” (Gudelj 2017).
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one side means the annihilation of the memory of the other’s side, any 
just judgment of the perpetrators will be just – but it will at the same time 
constitute a terrible injustice, an additional crime, depending on which 
ethnic group the convicted belong.
Due to the war ideology that continues to be the foundation of bh 
socio- political life and because of the domination of ethno- nationalist 
ideologies, citizens are left without political and ideological protection. 
For that reason, I would say we are participating in some kind of mental 
regression, returning to a lower degree of consciousness. Due to long- 
standing manipulation and the inability to change, citizens are drawn into 
social processes by seeking security in tradition and the past, in patterns 
which we have culturally exceeded (see Šijaković 2018, 2). Therefore, if 
one understands democracy in the Havelian sense, not as a set of formal 
rules but as “the piece of work of a man who understands his inalienable 
rights, who respects human rights and believes in the responsibility for 
his neighbor” (Ćosić 2000, 18), it is clear that it will take a lot of time to 
establish a just society; because the clearer the division between victims 
and perpetrators, the more rigid and greater the distance from taking 
responsibility and the neighbor concept.
It seems to me that the situation in bh changes the historical paradigm 
of history that it is written by the winners. Due to the ubiquitous vic-
timization, all three constituent peoples write their own history precisely 
from the perspective of the victims rather than from the perspective of 
the winners. However, since each constitutive people recognizes and 
 values  only its own victims, they have, in effect, through this glorifica-
tion virtually systematically perverted them, exposing them to a new 
sort of crime, hence to oblivion, to being forgotten by others. Because of 
such a deeply divided society, the recognition of the victims of one side 
necessarily leads to the negation of the victims of others. Because their 
victims are usually our crimes, so to recognize their victims is perceived as 
the betrayal of one’s own ethnic group. In the absence of social security, 
the price of this recognition would be social isolation, hence additional 
exposure and lack of protection.
Although some authors argue that the truth in itself does not  guarantee 
the healing of individual memories, that it may cause additional trauma 
and extreme suffering (see Snyder 2018, 28) leaving out a wider and 
complex relationship between the truth, memory and justice, I strongly 
believe the truth would be a liberating factor. Even if the truth will not 
be able to correct historical injustices, and even if the truth could never 
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be achieved, the effort towards the truth itself would be  invaluable. 
This effort to reach the truth would be confirmation for the victims 
as well as for the wider society that the state in which they live and to 
which they contribute recognizes the victims and their suffering, and 
condemns the crimes instead of making an institutional celebration of 
them 13. In the end, a state that does not condemn crimes or prosecute 
perpetrators of such crimes, and turns criminals into national heroes, 
sends the terrifying message to its citizens that their suffering can be 
repeated. While  retributive justice is not sufficient for the healing of 
society, “punitive justice can have both therapeutic and reconciliatory 
power”: “Trauma victims have lost their sense of safety in the world, 
and atrocities break down the trust between the perpetrators and their 
targets. Retributive justice can give the traumatized some sense of safety, 
and it can build trust among conflicting parties by affirming the fair 
rule of law” (Snyder 2008, 29).
5 Forgiving crimes against humanity?!
All ethnic conflicts include, more or less, the correction of the past. This 
“past that does not want to go” (Ricoeur 2004, 83), the extension to  civilian 
involvement in the cruelty of war, and the fact that the  prepetrators and 
victims are often forced to live together after the conflict all indicate the 
inability of the judicial apparatus or weakness of justice. As Vladimir 
Jankélévitch said with reference to Auschwitz, there is no justice that could 
remedy the crimes committed: “If any form of justice were to exist for the 
crimes against humanity, such justice would be a perversion of the moral 
sense” (Jankélévitch 2006, 35). It is precisely because of this metaphysical 
impotence or the failure of justice that the humanities and social sciences 
began systematically to explore the possibility of forgiveness.
The research on forgiveness illustrates that this topic is very complex 
and controversial. On the one hand, there are theorists who see for-
giveness as the only possibility for reconstruction of war- torn societies, 
and the only possibility for peaceful coexistence between victims and 
13 For example, on October 24th 2016, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska 
awarded Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić and Momčilo Krajišnik for their 
contribution to the creation of that entity. All three had been convicted for war 
crimes at ICTY (see Spajić 2017, 235).
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perpetrators. On the other hand, there are those who consider forgive-
ness to be an extension of the crimes, or betrayal of the victims, or a new, 
symbolic violence against them: “by forgiving we support evil” (Lauritzen 
1987, 147). Sharp criticism of forgiveness also comes from Lévinas, for 
whom forgiveness is so outrageous that it makes the world inhumane. 
He explains that “the world in which forgiveness is all- powerful becomes 
inhuman” (1986, 77). While Lévinas’s criticism is based on the inability 
of the Creator to forgive on behalf of the victims, Jankélévitch’s forgive-
ness as a perversion of the moral sense as well as the death of forgiveness 
in death camps are based on the evaluation of the gravity of the crime.
Two of Jankélévitch’s strongest arguments against the possibility of 
forgiveness refer to the principle of a double absence. The first absence is 
related to the legal system and refers to inability of proportional punish-
ment of such crimes. Since Auschwitz was a crime against humanity 
itself, a crime which attacked the very ontological essence of human 
beings, compensation is unthinkable; therefore, no kind of punish-
ment is possible. According to Jankélévitch, to be forgivable, a crime 
must be punishable. Hence, a crime against humanity is unforgivable 
because it is not punishable (see 2006, 46 – 48). The second absence is 
related to the moral order: the perpetrators did not ask for forgiveness; 
they did neither regret nor repent, nor did they show any remorse for 
what they did. Therefore, there cannot be any empathy for them: “Our 
terror of what intellect can’t conceive would suffocate our compassion 
at the very moment of its birth” (2006, 46). Unlike the first absence 
which manifests itself as a pure moral logic, the other shows itself more 
as pure logic of morality.
These difficult and entirely justified criticisms of forgiveness, have led 
to various discussions that have helped to crystallize the meaning of 
forgiveness, clearing it of various political- ideological elements and 
conceptual ambiguities. For example, a more positive approach to 
forgive ness is presented by Hannah Arendt. For her, forgiveness is a 
possible redemption from the irreversible because, without the possi-
bility of forgiveness, “our ability to act would be reduced just to the 
single deed in question” (2004, 175). Paul Ricœur, too, is inclined to 
observe forgiveness as redemption from the irreversible. According 
to Ricœur, the primary goal of forgiveness is healing memory, which 
concerns not only the victims, but also applies to future generations 
(see 2003, 649; 2004, 117 – 118). Since the healing of memory is under-
stood as the possibility of restoration, or rebuilding of society, many 
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authors argue that forgiveness could be a new model of international 
relations and the case of diplomacy (see more in: Lübbe 1991; Rouner 
1999). In fact, the crucial question is how the victims and the perpe-
trators can live together without forgetting the past, but also without 
being compelled to correct the past by revenge or vengeance.14
6 Questioning forgiveness in Bosnian society:  
“If I forgive, they will repeat”15
For Jürgen Moltmann, reconciliation will be possible once legitimacy of 
political power is attained through universal human rights. He claims 
that open recognition of the guilt, inner rejection of the ideology of vio-
lence, and forgiveness of the crime, should become a new state policy 
(see 1999, 28 – 29). These elements are partially present also in Miroslav 
Volf ’s suggestion of so- called exemplary use of memory. According to 
Volf, such use of memory is based on three principles: truth, therapy, and 
exemplarity. First, the question of truth in memory is the question of 
moral duty because “not to remember truthfully means to act unjustly” 
(2004, 229). Truth- deprived memory is emotionally burdened memory, 
an accepted myth accepted just because it is aesthetically attractive or 
socially imposed (see 2004, 227). Second, it is necessary that this  memory 
becomes a therapeutic memory. It is essential that this past successfully 
integrates into individual personality. Integration means “to make sense 
of what happened,” or at least, to accept it as an “irrational part of one’s 
own life” (2004, 233). The third principle leads to exemplary use of 
memory, which includes the motivation to protect future generations 
from the violence the present generation has suffered. This would be 
active participation in the construction of a more just world. Thus, an 
exemplary use of memory is about using the past for the purposes of the 
future: “Instead of being preoccupied with ‘curing one’s own wounds’ by 
keeping a hatred against perpetrators, a person involved in an exemplary 
14 This part has been taken – with some minor changes – from Maros 2015.
15 This was the answer of a victim of sexual violence when I asked her whether 
she has forgiven her assaulter. She was a guest in the ‘public discussions’ (in 
December 2016) that I have been hosting at the Catholic Theological Faculty 
in Sarajevo for almost three years. This was the very first time that she publicly 
testified about what she had lived through.
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use of memory will use the lessons from suffered injustice, to stopped 
injustice in the present” (Volf 2004, 235).
Although at the individual level, and at the level of neighborly rela-
tions, we do have some positive and truly admirable experiences,16 given 
the current state of bh society, it is abundantly clear that at the political 
level, all the conditions for reconciliation mentioned above are miss-
ing. One empirical study on reconciliation and forgiveness (one of the 
few in bh), lists eight conditions for reconciliation and stable peace: 
mutual security, mutual respect, humanization of the other, economic 
 stability, education and the media, just resolution of conflict, the curb-
ing of extremists on both sides, the gradual development of mutual 
trust, and cooperation. According to this study, the failure to attain 
these conditions is year after year, exacerbated by political manipula-
tion (see Petrović 2010, 19 – 22). Adding the psychological and cogni-
tive difficulties of individuals and communities which matured under 
a culture of violence, it is rationally and realistically difficult to expect 
an improvement of quality of life in the country. The aforementioned 
empirical study shows that the absence of all required conditions for 
reconciliation constantly threatens peace in society. This contributes 
to the production of fear of the other, ethnic distance and distrust of 
those from other ethnic groups while strengthening stereotypes. As this 
study claims the mass media, nationalism and dogmatism as dominant 
social ideologies are playing a significant role in creating such a social 
environment (see Perišić 2010, 146 – 147).
Thus, for the political leadership of the country, the reconciliation 
of the people is not a priority (see more in: Petrović 2010, 68) because 
only a deep division of society saves them from taking responsi bility for 
 having disabled the functioning of the state, and from taking responsi-
bility for the spiritual and material exploitation of its citizens. Besides 
this lack of political will, which is far more important than some 
idealists would like to think, in bh society many misunderstandings 
regarding forgiveness or reconciliation are present. Usually, people 
consider forgiveness to be a religious slogan deprived of its meaning, 
16 For example, Zijo Ribić was eight years old when he survived the shooting by 
the Serbian paramilitary organization. His entire family was killed: parents, six 
sisters and one brother. Before the shooting they were tortured, and the sisters 
were raped. In his public talk, Ribić says that he has forgiven; that he hates no 
one and that people should reconcile and move on. (See Klix 2015)
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a new ideological tool for a new insidious policy, or a demand for 
amnesty for crimes (see Tokača 2017). Moreover, when hearing the 
word ‘forgiveness,’ the first reaction is usually emotional. It is claimed 
that forgiveness is inapplicable in multi- ethnic communities such as 
bh, and that reconciliation after the genocide is absolutely impos-
sible. Reconciliation, among other things, would mean a return to 
the time of bh’s prior state organization. In a country where the inter-
nal boundaries have been defined by ethnic cleansing, reconciliation 
is unattainable. Finally, the word forgiveness is a huge burden for the 
victims, who often find themselves forced to make the first step; and 
they are also confused, because forgiveness challenges their essential / 
fundamental dignity, as well as their basic, instinctive, and completely 
justified sense of justice (see Tokača 2017).
In addition, the term reconciliation is considered to come from the 
Christian tradition, implying a forgiveness and dialogue thought to be 
a hypocritical call to forgive and forget: another dehumanization of the 
victims and denial of their dignity. Even if individuals forgive the mur-
der of their entire family, the state must not do the same. From the state, 
we must require justice, meaning that the criminals must be punished, 
in order to give victims at least minimal moral satisfaction. Genocide 
seeks for justice, not for forgiveness! It is a crime which we cannot, and 
should not, forgive or reconcile (see Tokača 2017).
Those who dare to speak about forgiveness, those lone individuals 
who are calling for forgiveness of historical accidents for which there is 
no more healing, are more or less readily and sharply condemned by the 
public: Firstly, because of the use of such euphemisms as ‘historical acci-
dents’ – crimes against humanity are not accidents – and secondly, on 
behalf of a civilization in which the legal system is supposed to ensure 
justice for the victims of heinous crimes. The court must punish crim-
inals and restore what can be restored, thereby returning dignity to the 
victims, so that they “at least get moral satisfaction from knowing that 
the society in which they live is condemning this crime against human-
ity” (Popović 2002). It is said that with this call to forgive, politicians 
want a leisurely escape from their responsibility, since the country is 
already destroyed and the people already expelled. On the other hand, 
a religious leader’s calls for peace, dialogue, and reconciliation, are no 
more than a hypocritical way of trying to cover the fact that they gave 
their blessing to these crimes of war and that they are still in an oppor-
tunistic relationship with the current political structure of the country 
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(see more in: Perišić 2010, 146 – 148).17 Therefore, in this country, under 
such conditions, forgiveness is capitulation before a history of wars and 
crimes, and of civilization before religious and political dictatorship (see 
Popović 2002). Even when the dignity of criminals is recognized, such 
recognition is limited by the necessity to mete out just punishment. This 
punishment is required to give criminals the possibility of rehabilitation, 
but it must also ensure the possibility of the victims’ rehabilitation as 
well. “The compassion goes first to the victims, and if there is any left, 
to the criminals” (Popović 2017).
7 Instead of a conclusion
After having presented some aspects of the political abuse of  memory and 
the public view of forgiveness, the rebuilding of society and the possibility 
for forgiveness may appear to be more like illusive ideas borrowed from 
onlookers than a desire born from necessity in bh society. Despite the fact 
that selective memory was one of the major causes of the crimes against 
humanity, the present bh leadership continues to select, filter, and deny 
what happened during the nineties. In this regard, they continue the 
Yugoslavian politics of denying historical facts in order to push a specific 
national narrative, concerning in particular the memories of the wars in 
17 This attitude towards religious representatives and communities stems from the 
general perception of society for their involvement in social processes. Despite 
the fact that some religious representatives appealed to stop the war, and despite 
the official statements of the Bishops’ Conference of bh which convicted crimes 
(see the statements of the Church representatives in Zovkić 1998), the religious 
community, thus the Catholic Church, failed to avoid “ethnicity and nationa-
lism” (Cvitković 2006, 89). Since the memory was systematically suppressed 
and prohibited in Yugoslavia, on such occasions the religious community was 
the only “guardian of the memory culture” (Jukić 1997, 297). Considering reli-
gion was a key element in the distinction of peoples in bh, religious communi-
ties (Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism) played a large and important role in 
national identification. Although it is undoubted that the war in bh was not a 
religious one, “it remains indisputable that, before, during and after the conflict, 
religious communities were indrawn in the process of restoring old memories” 
(Jukić 1997, 290; see also 296 – 297). With the collapse of Yugoslavia, a territorial 
identity (refering to Yugoslavia) disappeared as well, and many tried to find their 
own national identity during which religious communities have considerably 
contributed as “guardians of memories” (Cvitković 2006, 9).
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the nineteen nineties. Therefore, if we follow Bar- Tal’s theory, and we do 
not change this adopted mindset, we may expect future  generations to 
receive the legacy of the moral duty to correct the past. Since we already 
have a generation that has grown up under the influence of collective 
trauma, nationalist and religious indoctrination, as well as widespread 
poverty and spiritual violence, what would correcting the past eventually 
look like? I fear that this time the correction of the past would be even 
more evil than in the nineties. If this generation is going to correct the 
past, would they be perpetrators or victims? Will the death of their future 
victims be more on account of the system and of those who supported 
it, or will the society that made them punish them? In the end, even if 
they do not become perpetrators, are not they today’s victims a  product 
of our moral guilt and our shame? In a globalized world, has not the 
time come to also globalize the guilt, which Jaspers refers to as a political 
responsibility (see Jaspers 2009, 26)?
It is obvious that the problems of memory, justice and forgiveness that 
bh society urgently needs to face are extremely challenging. Although 
the thoughts about memory, justice, forgiveness, and reconciliation cover 
many different realities, it seems that I wouldn’t go astray if I were to 
recapitulate them as two fundamental misunderstandings: the question 
of the relationship between forgiveness and justice and the relationship 
between forgiveness and memory. Both of them, apparently, seem to be 
deposits of humanity for some better and happier future. I say  apparently 
because, despite their rationality, I am afraid that, under our current 
social condition, they are more of a militant call for correcting the past 
rather than thoughtful deposit for a happier future. This rationality appears 
only at one superficial level of reflection: it appears on cursory thought, 
which is no more than an immediate reaction of consciousness to what 
was read. In itself it may not be incorrect, but it definitely is not mature 
enough to be qualified as true.
Thus, the bh socio- political scene has been dominated for more than 
twenty years by two axioms, which, despite their aggressive tones, run 
through society like one tired mantra, worn by repetition without real 
impact, and repeated by effect without real renewal. These two axioms 
are: First justice, then forgiveness! and, Forgive but do not forget! In 
facing the first, some deeper thought is being painted with a nostal-
gic melancholy; in facing the second, the thought is stopped by fear 
reflecting everything but nostalgic melancholy. The first one stands in 
its firm and unshakable conviction that the minimum requirement for 
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forgiveness is the necessity to admit to crimes and to prosecute per-
petrators (see Petrović 2010, 26 – 27, 30). The second one covers two 
disparities. The first is to forget one’s violent past, and the second is to 
encourage remembrance in order to forgive. It is generally said that, on 
the one hand, those who know their own history are likely to repeat it 
(because of victimization), which is why forgetting would be necessary 
in order to avoid this repeating of history. On the other hand, to  forget 
tragic history would mean to forget the victims, therefore, repeating their 
suffering and death (see Volf 2004, 225 – 226; 236). Thus, the alterna-
tive is placed between the “little memory that makes the future empty” 
(Elshtain 1999, 35) or “the victim’s demented memory” (Vuleta 2004, 
373) that, on the contrary, fills the future with the silent vow to correct 
the past. While the first axiom artificially introduces the metaphysical 
distance between forgiveness and justice, the second one artificially 
smoothes out the difference between forgetting and forgiveness. For-
giveness is not an alternative to justice; it is a way of doing justice. It 
is also the absolute opposite of forgetting, because in the end, there is 
no need to forgive what was forgotten (see more in: Volf 2002, 26 – 27; 
see Ricoeur 2004, 110 – 113).
Taking into consideration all the specificities of the Bosnian socio- 
political context, I cannot avoid asking myself: despite all excellent 
theoretical elaboration on forgiveness, is this not just theory? Can this 
noble and highly moral theory pass the test of harsh reality, or the test of 
human possibilities and limitations? Is not the request for forgiveness in 
a society where violent structures are still present, itself violent? Would 
not a talk about forgiveness mean “to help persecutors to convince per-
secuted to accept their persecution”? (Volf 2002, 24)
Despite intellectual or moral reserves that I might show in this reflection, 
I strongly believe that an intellectually and morally responsible Christian 
ethos of forgiveness could make many social contributions, even in a multi- 
ethnic and multi- religious society. Both normative ethics (memory) and 
virtue ethics (forgiveness and violence) could have an important social 
impact on all of society. Taking into account the importance and the 
influence of memory and forgiveness on human life (from the creation 
of personal identity – memory – to the possibility of its re- creation – 
forgiveness) I modestly believe that Christian ethics generally shows a 
lack of sufficient exploration of these arguments, which is almost com-
pletely absent in our society. Is not this intellectual disinterest already a 
troublesome/worrying ethical and moral question?
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I also would say that any serious Christian ethos of forgiveness should 
start by exploring the problem of violence. Therefore, it seems to me that 
a serious ethical approach to violence is urgently needed as well. Today, 
this may be more urgent than the talk about forgiveness. Perhaps explor-
ing violence from the perspective of ethics could be one of the ways to the 
correct use of memory, or the ethics of memory. Maybe, this way we could 
write history from what we failed to do, and of what we could have done 
differently. Instead of making a list of scientifically cold facts and collect-
ing our historical suffering as a degrading proof that our society does not 
have war winners. Or as a proof that we are creating a culture of feeding 
on old wounds? Would not this, from a psychological point of view, ped-
agogically and morally be more responsible and useful for our  society? 
In other words, would not talking about the ‘rehabilitation of victims’ 
through the confrontation with the past, the prosecution of criminals, 
and the fight against injustice, bring us to a rehabilitation of faith and a 
restoration of morality? Neither of these aspirations of faith and morality 
has successfully survived the transition in bh.
I would like to conclude this paper by giving a possible Christian answer 
to the aforementioned misunderstanding regarding the relationship 
between forgiveness and justice and forgiveness and forgetting. Although 
I do not claim that forgiveness is a Christian prerogative, however, I think 
that the forgiveness of such type of crimes requires a degree of spiritual-
ity, a reference point outside of ourselves. Because I believe that resisting 
this kind of violence requires the recognition of a dimension under the 
possibilities of our basic humanity. I also believe that the corresponding 
forgiveness, as the other side of the same extreme, requires the recogni-
tion of a dimension beyond the capability of our basic humanity. From the 
Christian point of view, justice is necessary but has its own limitations. 
In a society in which every group is a victim and in which our criminals 
are their heroes and their heroes are our criminals, achieving full justice is 
impossible (see Volf 2002, 26). In addition, psychologically and mentally 
traumatizing experiences always remain something that only forgiveness 
can heal, which means that forgiveness does not lose its meaning even 
if damage is repaired or justice done. “No one can make what was done 
undone. It will always remain that evil was committed” (Vučković 1995, 25).
As to the relationship of forgiveness and memory, Ricœur speaks of 
forgiveness as “active forgetting”. As an act of regret, an act of memory, 
forgiveness is not about forgetting the events themselves, but rather forget-
ting the guilt which paralyzes the creative memory needed for a common 
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future (see Ricœur 2004, 110 – 113). Maybe one of the best examples of this 
creative memory is biblical: holy memory, or remembering the Exodus 
and the Cross (or Resurrection). In celebrating these feasts, every Chris-
tian is called to meditate on their meanings: not slavery and oppression in 
Egypt, nor the violence of the Cross – but God’s grace of liberation from 
them (see Popović 2004, 33). Christian memory does not advocate forget-
ting, especially not one which would lead to the repetition of evil. What 
needs not to be forgotten is the liberation from evil. This holy memory 
therefore also preserves a love which warns us that the innocent should 
never suffer again in our presence (Šarčević 2004, 348).
Bibliography
Arendt, Hannah (2004): Vita activa. La condizione umana. Milano: Tascabili Bompiani.
Bakšić- Muftić, Jasna (2005): Razumijevanje Dejtonskog ustava 10 godina kasnije. 
In: Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu 42, 67 – 92.
Bar- Tal, Daniel (2007): Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts. 
In: American Behavioral Scientist 11, 1430 – 1453.
Bar- Tal, Daniel; Chernyak- Hai, Lily; Shori, Noa; Gundar, Ayelet (2009): A sense 
of self- perceived collective victimhood in intractable conflicts. In: International 
Review of The Red Cross 91, 229 – 258.
Buttino, Marco; Rutto, Giuseppe (eds.) (1997): Nazionalismi e conflitti etnici 
nell’Europa orientale. Milano: Feltrinelli.
Cvitković, Ivan (2006), Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini. Hrvati između 
nacionalnog i građanskog. Zagreb, Sarajevo: Synopsis.
Ćosić, Anto (2000): Politička filozofija Václava Havela. Sarajevo: Napredak.
Depo (2017): I Nacisti su bježali u smrt. Od Goebbelsa i Himmlera do Slobodana 
Praljka: Ovo su najpoznatiji zločinci koji su otrovom izbjegli pravdu, online 
available <http://depo.ba/clanak/169450/od- goebbelsa- i- himmlera- do- slobodana- 
praljka- ovo- su- najpoznatiji- zlocinci- koji- su- otrovom- izbjegli- pravdu>, accessed 
June 20, 2018.
Diegoli, Tommaso (2007): Kolektivno pamćenje i obnova društva u poslijeratnoj 
Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo: Fond otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina.
Dogliotti, Miro; Rosiello, Luigi (eds.) (1997): Vocabolario della lingua italiana di 
Nicola Zingarelli. Bologna: Zanichelli.
Elshtain, Jean B. (1999): Politics and Forgiveness. In: Rouner, Leroy S. (ed.):  Religion, 
Politics, and Peace. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 32 – 47.
Eyerman, Ron (2007): Il passato nel presente: cultura e trasmissione della  memoria. 
In: Rampazi, Marita; Tota, Anna Lisa (eds.): La memoria pubblica. Trauma cul-
turale, nuovi confini e identità nazionali. Milano: UTET, 60 – 72.
Fabietti, Ugo (1998): L’Identità etnica. Roma: Carocci Editore.
152 Zorica Maros
Fabietti, Ugo; Matera, Vincenzo (1999): Memorie e identità. Simboli e strategie 
del ricordo. Roma: Meltemi.
Gudelj, J. (2017): Ovako mrze bošnjački novinari. Evo s kime trebamo živjeti. 
Gnjusne reakcije bošnjačke javnosti na smrt generala Praljka, online available 
<https://www.dnevnik.ba/teme/evo- s- kim- trebamo- zivjeti- gnjusne- reakcije- bosnjacke- 
javnosti- na- smrt- generala- praljka>,accessed June 14, 2018.
Haverić, Tarik (2016): Kritika bosanskog uma. Ogled o jednom historijski fiksianom 
mentalitetu. Sarajevo: ECLD.
Heimbach- Steins, Marianne (2017): In search of justice – a theological- ethical plea 
for cultivating and healing the memory of a violent past. In: Maros,  Zorica; 
Tomašević, Darko (eds.): Pravda u BH drušvu. Izazov temeljne ljudskosti. 
Sarajevo/ Zagreb: Katolički bogoslovni fakultet- Glas Koncila, 55 – 74.
Heyer, Kristin E. (2017): Political justice and the common good: Overcomming 
Barriers to exclusion. In: Maros, Zorica; Tomašević, Darko (eds.): Pravda u 
BH društvu. Izazov temeljne ljudskosti. Sarajevo/Zagreb: Katolički bogoslovni 
fakultet- Glas Koncila, 103 – 121.
Hogan, Linda (2017): Cultivating Justice and Peace. In: Maros, Zorica; Tomašević, 
Darko (eds.): Pravda u BH društvu. Izazov temeljne ljudskosti. Sarajevo/Zagreb: 
Katolički bogoslovni fakultet- Glas Koncila, 243 – 253.
Jankélévitch, Vladimir (2006): Verzeihen? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Jaspers, Karl (2009): Pitanje krivice. Beograd: Fondacija Konrad Adenauer.
Jukić, Jakov (1997): Lica i maske svetog. Ogledi iz društvene religiologije. Zagreb: 
Kršćanska sadašnjost.
Kapo, Midhat (2012): Nacionalizam i obrazovanje: Studija slučaja Bosna i Herce-
govina, Sarajevo: Fond otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina.
Kivimäki, Timo; Kramer, Marina; Pasch, Paul (2012): Dinamika konflikta u multiet-
ničkoj državi Bosni i Hercegovini. Studija analize konflikta u pojedinim  zemljama, 
Sarajevo: Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung.
Klix – M. H. (2015): Jedini preživjeli u devetočlanoj porodici: Zijo će danas iden-
tificirati četiri ubijene sestre, online available <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/
jedini- prezivjeli- u- devetoclanoj- porodici- zijo- ce- danas- identificirati- cetiri- ubijene- 
sestre/151220065>, accessed March 03, 17.
Lauritzen, Paul (1987): Forgiveness: Moral Prerogative or Religious Duty? In:  Journal 
of Religious Ethics 15, 141 – 154.
Lévinas, Emmanuel (1986): Difficile libertà. Brescia: La scuola.
Lübbe, Hermann (2003): „Ich entschuldige mich“ Das neue politische Bußritual. 
Berlin: Berliner Taschenbuch Verlag.
Maros, Zorica (2014): Vpliv kolektivnega spomina na nasilje: spomin kot poprav-
ljanje preteklosti. In: Bogoslovni vestnik 74, 565 – 573.
Maros, Zorica (2015): Od maščevalnosti vojne do maščevanja: (ne)možnost 
odpuščanja. In: Bogoslovni vestnik 75, 51 – 64.
Milovanović, Selma (2017): Slobodan Praljak: War criminal or Croatian hero?, 
online available <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/slobodan- praljak- war- 
criminal- croatian- hero-171130181546531.html>, accessed June 20, 2018.
Moltmann, Jürgen (1999): Political Reconciliation. In Rouner, Leroy S (ed.):  Religion, 
Politics, and Peace. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
153Relationships between memory, justice and forgiveness
Perišić, Neda (2010): Monolitne naracije i opsesija (etničkom) pripadnošću. Mediji 
i proces pomirenja stanovnika u Bosni i Hercegovini. In: Puhalo, Srđan (et.al. 
eds.): Spremnost na pomirenje u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, 67 – 148.
Petrović, Nebojša (2010): Sociopsihološki aspekti pomirenja u Bosni i Hercegovini 
nakon 15 godina mira. In: Puhalo, Srđan (et.al. eds.) Spremnost na pomirenje u 
Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 13 – 66.
Pinter, Zlatko (2017): General Praljak je dokazao istinu i to je problem za Tribunal, 
online available <https://kamenjar.com/general- praljak- je- dokazao- istinu- je- problem- 
za- tribunal>, accessed June 14, 2018.
Pirjevec, Jože (2002): Le guerre jugoslave 1991 – 1999. Torino: Einaudi.
Popović, Ante (2004): Biblija kao knjiga pamćenja. In: Vuleta, Bože (et.al. eds.): 
Kršćanstvo i pamćenje. Kršćansko pamćenje i osobođenje od zlopamćenja. Split- 
Zagreb: Franjevački institut za kulturu mira- Hrvatski Caritas, 21 – 56.
Popović, Srđa (2002): Kapitulacija pred zločinom, online available <http://www.
vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=321346>, accessed November 02, 2017.
Ricœur, Paul (2003): La memoria, la storia, l’oblio. Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore.
Ricœur, Paul (2004): Ricordare, dimenticare, perdonare. L’enigma del passato. 
Bologna: Il Mulino.
Rouner, Leroy S. (ed.) (1999): Religion, Politics, and Peace. Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press.
Rydgren, Jens (2007): The Power of the Past: A Contribution to a Cognitive  Sociology 
of Ethnic Conflict. In: Sociological Theory 25 (3), 225 – 244.
Sarenac, Srdjan (2017): Two Schools trailer for a documentary by Srdjan Sarenac, 
online available <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C66QAxJyCJU>, accessed 
November 14, 2017.
Snyder, Justin (2008): An Introducton to Trauma and Politics: Victimhood, Regret, 
and Healing, online available <https://12f828f2-a-62cb3a1a- s- sites.googlegroups.com/
site/amalgamjournal/Home/15.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqZ1DMT3kQ2G-yUXpELF
ImzIVMYnth4Sw43sygvcWq52QR0ZOf6eoNh- hdmadbRstrkbPYygf1WytVoa1v3T2
q0nKFncQN6GNFsiMEa9z0TaskRYkiY-NJ7ivuO_il4_HAjOtr5z50 × 5dHuFiqrhi7 
CGFZeh5G_aT4BmjuHea9QzMd3pM1kQXLSCAZdx6XVHlmmhZ9l_qFqnE 
aEqnVZm_yNFEmXnQ%3D%3D&attredirects=0>, accessed January 12, 2018.
Spajić, Zdenko (2017): Katoličko poimanje pravednosti: Može li Katolička crkva 
doprinijeti pravednijem uređenju BiH. In: Maros, Zorica; Tomašević, Darko 
(eds.): Pravda u BH društvu. Izazov temeljne ljudskosti. Sarajevo, Zagreb: 
Katolički bogoslovni fakultet- Glas Koncila, 209 – 241.
Šarčević, Ivan (2004): Pamćenje bez Uskrsnuća. Isusov križ iz perspektive uskrsne 
nade. In: Vuleta, Bože (et.al. eds.): Kršćanstvo i pamćenje. Kršćansko pamćenje i 
oslobođenje od zlopamćenja. Split- Zagreb: Franjevački institut za kulturu mira- 
Hrvatski Caritas, 333 – 349.
Šarčević, Ivan (2014): Zečevi, zmije i munafici. Sarajevo- Zagreb: Synopsis.
Šijaković, Ivan (2005): Građansko društvo u kandžama etnokratije, online  available 
<http://.sijakovic.com/02/gradansko- drustvo- u- kandzama- etnokratije/>, accessed 
January 12, 2018.
154 Zorica Maros
Tokača, Mirsad (2012): Bosanska knjiga mrtvih. Ljudski gubici u Bosni i Hercego-
vini 1991 – 1995. Sarajevo: Istraživačko dokumentacioni centar Sarajevo.
Tokača, Mirsad (2017): Nakon genocida, pomirenje je u Bosni nemoguće, online 
available <http://stav.ba/mirsad- tokaca- nakon- genocida- pomirenje- je- u- bosni- 
nemoguce/>, accessed 02. 11. 2017.
Trbić, Dženana (ed.) (2007): Obrazovanje u Bosni i Hercegovini: Čemu učimo 
djecu? Analiza sadržaja udžbenika nacionalne grupe predmeta. Sarajevo: Fond 
otvoreno društvo Bosna i Hercegovina.
Valković, Marijan (1991): Sto godina katoličkog socijalnog nauka. Zagreb:  Kršćanska 
sadašnjost.
Volf, Miroslav (2002): Oprost, pomirenje i pravda. Kršćanski doprinos mirni-
jem društvenom okruženju. In: Anić, Rebeka; Litre, Ivan M. (eds.): Oprost i 
pomirenje. Izazov Crkvi i društvu, Zagreb/Split: Hrvatski Caritas – Franjevački 
institut za kulturu mira, 19 – 32.
Volf, Miroslav (2004): Istinitost, terapija, egzemplarnost. In: Vuleta, Bože (et.al. 
eds.): Kršćanstvo i pamćenje. Kršćansko pamćenje i oslobođenje od zlopamćenja. 
Split/ Zagreb: Franjevački institut za kulturu mira, 225 – 238.
Volkan, Vamik D. (2000): Traumatized Societies and Psychological Care:  Expanding 
the Concept of Preventive Medicine, online available <http://freudconference.com.
au/online_papers/Traumatized_Societies_And_Psychological_Care.pdf>, accessed 
June 11, 2014.
Volkan, Vamik D. (2001): Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: 
An Aspect of Large- Group Identity, online available <http://gaq.sagepub.com/
content/34/1/79>, accessed October 21, 2015.
Vučković, Ante (1995): Struktura zla i oprost. In: Vuleta, Bože (ed): Praštanje. Zbornik 
radova sa znanstvenog simpozija. Split/Sinj: Franjevački institut za kulturu mira.
Vuleta, Bože; Anić, Rebeka; Litre, Ivan Milanović (2004): Kršćanstvo i pamćenje. 
Kršćansko pamćenje i oslobođenje od zlopamćenja. Split/ Zagreb: Franjevački 
institut za kulturu mira- Hrvatski Caritas.
Weine, Stevan (1999): When History is Nightmare: Lives and Memories of Ethnic 
Cleansing in Bosnia – Hercegovina. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Zerjavic, Vladimir (1998): Manipulations with the Number of Second World War 
Victims, online available <https://www.hercegbosna.org/STARO/download- eng/
Zerjavic_manipulations.pdf>, accessed June 15, 2018.
Zovkić, Mato (1998): War Wounds in Croatian Catholic Population of Bosnia- 
Hrezegovina. In: Mojzes, Paul (ed.): Religion and the War in Bosnia. Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 207 – 217.
About the Author
Zorica Maros, Prof. Dr. sc., Professor of Moral Theology at the  Catholic 
Theological Faculty of University of Sarajevo. E-Mail: maroszorica@
gmail.com.
